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Tihe problem of whether the cultural and social environ­
ment of natural sciences, physics in particular, can influ­
ence the structure of their theories is considered. It is ar­
gued that the structure of particular theories is often in­
fluenced by the environment however not in a direct way 
but through the scientific community itself in the process 
of its struggle to gain autonomy and respectability with; -> 
the outer environment. In particular, such an influence 
occurs whenever rival theories, empirically indistiguishable 
at a given time, are formulated, without regard as to whether 
v the scientific field in question is in a Kuhnian »crisis« 
or not. The mechanism whereby the scientific community 
homogenizes itself against the outer environment, by mak­
ing a utilitarian and pragmatistic selection among the rival 
theories is elaborated. The process is illustrated by the 
example of the wave-particle duality of light and matter.
INTRODUCTION
»It happened at a conference in London in the thirties. A Russian dele­
gation turned up too late and the somewhat stiff Englishmen did not allow 
them any time to present their contributions. Therepon, they had these con­
tributions printed in record time and distributed among the participants. One 
,of their papers caused a sensation: it purported to show, in the spirit of histori­
cal materialism, that Newton’s discovery of the law of gravitation was prompted 
by his endeavours of the time — the determination of longitude at sea, a 
problem that had arisen from the expansion of long distance sailing . .. It can 
indeed be documented that Newton took an early interest in geography (he 
edited an issue of Varenius’ manual) and even industriously studied books on 
navigation. That such a thesis ... could then impress the English, only evi­
dences the sad neglect of Newton studies in England [at the time], as a result 
of which they were not prepared to take a more critical view of the matter.« 
(Rosenfeld, 1972)
Since then it has become increasingly evident that theories not only of 
social but also of natural sciences could be influenced by their social and 
cultural environment. The only thing on which no common consent has been 
reached is the way in which such an influence can take place. Actually, the 
ever growing complexity of theories as well as of their historical origins, on
37
Pavičić, M., Physical theories and their . . . ,  Rev. za soc., Vol. XVIII (1987), N° 3—4 : 37—54
the one hand, and the poor susceptibility of the theories of natural phenomena 
to social demands, on the other, make the task too complicated to be solvable 
at the present stage of investigation. For example, whether the economic growth 
in Europe necessarily caused corpuscular theory of light to be developed before 
the wave theory of light, or whether it could have been the other way round, 
obviously cannot be answered without taking into account all the other scien­
tific theories developed prior to those two. In doing so we blur the peculiarities 
among the proper influence of the environment on the theories and the mutual 
influence of the theories themselves, and, as a result, investigations become 
hopelessly complicated. Besides, such an approach, when started, cannot offer 
a much better insight into the problem until a pile of empirical studies of the 
actual development and growth of science is collected. Pending then new cases 
are likely to invalidate one set of assumptions after the other. For example, 
after only a decade, Kuhn’s elaboration of normal versus revolutionary sciences 
turned out not to hold water. (Suppe, 1977) Lakatos’ research progammes have 
undergone a similar criticism. (Ibid.) Feyerabend’s »anything goes« contrivance 
suggestively indicates that actual theories development cannot be described 
by too simplistic a model. (Ibid.) On1 the other hand, Popper’s and Sneed’s 
logical critera for apipraising new scientific hypotheses can hardly be adapted 
to include the actual practice of producing new theories.
In a word, all the models designed to describe the actual development of 
scientific theories throw but a partial light on the way in which their cultural 
and social environment influence them. However, an onlooker can object that 
apparently there are exceptions to this rule. For, Forman (1971), e. g. claims 
that there existed a direct influence of the cultural environment on the way 
in which quantum mechanics was formulated in the twenties. Actually there 
is a whole class of such exceptions, though not in the sense that Forman put 
forward. Namely, the class of empirically indistinguishable theories, on which 
I shall dwell bellow.
In order to make our statements clearer we shall first introduce some 
definitions. We consider scientists as mediators between theories and the en­
vironment. The environment itself we split into two parts: the inner and the 
outer, in the following sense. Scientists engaged in a particular field are heav­
ily dependent and influenced by more or less distant peer (from colleagues in 
a team or department to referees in journals) recognition and approval. Thus 
all the scientists engaged in a particular scientific field represent a rather 
homogenous group. The group as a unit transfers social demands from the 
»outside world« to the individual scientists, however translated into specific 
inner values and rules. (»Although the thought collective is composed of indi­
viduals, it is not simply their sum«. (Fleck, 1080)) Such a group, together with 
its history of former achievements and its values and rules, we call the inner 
environment. The outside world together with its social and cultural values, 
and its political and economic systems, we call the outer environment. Empiri­
cally indistinguishable (at a given time) theories we call rival theories.
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INNER VALUES AND OUTER DEMANDS
The paper mentioned in the( opening quotation is the one presented by 
Boris Hessen to the International Congress of the History of Science, London, 
1931, and published by Bukharin et al. (1931). It was a challenge at the time, 
but it was soon recognized that »[i]t is not enough to correlate a set of 
[scientific] ideas with one social group or class and believe therefore that a 
social basis [of a scientific development] has been established. [Historians] must 
examine the activities in which this group is engaged which in turn could make 
use of the ideas and techniques in question«. (Mendelsohn, 1977) For, theories 
of natural sciences have to be suited to describe and predict particular ex­
perimental data whatever prompted the appearance of the theories themselves. 
Besides, to come back to Newton, geography is not the only field in which 
he took an interest. »Newton left voluminous writings on theology, chronology, 
alchemy, and chemistry, in all of which he was profoundly learned«, (Collier’s 
Encyclopedia, 1971, Vol. 17, p. 470)
In other words, outer demands only prompt scientists to dwell on particular 
scientific problems, and do not determine which particular theories will emerge 
out of such an engagement. The latter process is carried out by the inner 
scientific environment, while the former one is the matter of the outer en­
vironment. Since there are still many scientists who would rather not recognize 
even this demarcation line, claiming that their scientific work is motivated by 
an abstract, asocial, individual curiosity, I shall review some recent sources 
in support to the claim. (Later on, it will turn out that such a belief in pure 
scientific »[c]uriosity justifies a kind of escapism in which the scientific worker 
refuses to recognize the part she or he is forced to play in class society« (Albury
& Schwartz, 1982).)
Cini (1980) pointed out that theoretical particle physics embraced (in the 
late 1950’s) a »utilitarian and pragmatic, but fragmentary, concept of science 
with the subsequent abandoning of its traditional aim of the unification of 
knowledge«. »[SJtressing that inclusion in [the Institute of Defense] consultat­
ive elite functioned as a mark of scientific eminence among US theorists, [Cini] 
suggested that this drastic shift in epistemic goals »was not a mechanical adap­
tation [to] an environment.. . but an active identification of [their] own inter­
ests.« (Forman, 1978) »Recently, the more detailed studies by Schweber 
[1985] and Pickering [1985] have confirrhed the insights of Cini and his 
associates, presenting much evidence of the phenomenologic turn taken by 
elementary particle theory in the late 1950’s with ontologic commitments re­
jected in favor of instrumentalist rules of dispersion and S-matrix theory. 
They find this reorientation was far more characteristic of America than Eu­
rope, and they give further arguments for regarding this turn as reflecting 
both militarization of the social purposes of physics in the US, and a particular 
mental posture fostered by the application of brain-grease military matters.« 
(Forman, 1987)
»The list of military astronomy-related projects is in fact rather long . . . 
[T]he researcher does not pose questions about its use . . . This kind of attitude 
is welcomed by the military, who may even encourage it. By distributing in a
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proper way the funds to research, they have no problem in influencing the 
choices of the scientists and privilege the fields of more interest to them. 
Sooner or later the ’free and pure’ scientist will, consciously or unconsciously, 
follow the mošt promising research subjects (that is the most funded) which 
offer more opportunities for his career, and will start to find natural that 
basic research which is supported by the military.« (Vaghi, 1980)
«■From 1945 onwards, successive [British] goverments (whether Labour or 
Conservative) drew the net of state-science interaction tighter, culminating 
when, under the 1970 Conservative goverment, the Rotschild Report, A Frame 
for Goverment Research and Development, challenged the Haldane principle 
[according to which Reseach Councils were independent of Departments of 
State] head on, and, over the vociferous protests of the scientific elite, was 
accepted as the future basis for the management of science.« (Rose & Rose, 
1976)
The majority of U. S. corporations »discourage their scientists, sometimes 
forbid them, from publishing the results of their work in the learned journals 
or communicating them in any way to scientists outside the company preserve. 
More inhibiting, most corporations do not let their scientists devote more than 
a fraction of their time [5—10°/o] following up problem of their own choosing«. 
(Whyte, 1957)
These recent examples indicate that the outer community tends not only 
to purchase intelectual services in order to get solutions to particular techno­
logical demands but also to restrict and jeopardize the autonomy and freedom 
of scientific investigations eVen when once established. As s response to this 
threat particular scientific communities try to homogenize themselves as strong­
ly as possible imposing on their members rather strict rules of behaviour 
and of inner language, paradigms and ideals they share, and expecting particu­
lar traits of personalities and even common prejudices. In this sense »[t]he 
theory that scientists follow only the internal rules of science would seem to 
reinforce their efforts to prevent subordination of their work to standards 
extrinsic to science and protect themselves from external political influence«. 
(Ezrahi, 1971) At first sight it realy seems to be a well devised tactic. Thus 
»[t]he Philip Report [in Australia] was produced as an essentially political 
response aimed at defending the autonomy of science from what was perceived 
as primarily a threat from ’outsider’ bureaucrats: »Creative production of 
science depends on the autonomous operation of self-imposed values and con­
trols. It is ultimately self-defeating for a society or goverment to erode- the 
autonomy of the scientific community«.« (Jagtenberg, 1958) However, a closer 
examination of behaviour, inner rules, ideal personalities and prejudices which 
scientists »self-impose« on themselves, reveals that there is something wrong 
here. For, very often event these »values« are precisely those which the em­
ployers would like scientists to have, and precisely those which the public would 
expect to fit into advertised stereotypes- of the ideal scientists. (Holton, 1978) 
For example, the Well-known ’fresh-blood’ prejudice:
»The ’fresh-blood’ argument has served the scientific managers and govern­
ment administrators well, since they have been able to exploit the widely 
held belief that you have to be young to be ’productive’ in research. The level
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of political consciousness (and trade union organization) among the workforce 
was so low that this argument passed unehalenged [though i]t was almost trans­
parently false. The myth of the superior originality of young researchers began 
in 1920’s when there were a f e w . . .  ’Wunderkinder’ — Pauli, Heisenberg, and 
Dirac — involved in creating quantum mechanics . .. The actual situation is 
quite different... The average age of Noble Prize winning physicists, when 
they did their prize winning work, is 37 years old [including Pauli, Heisenberg, 
and Dirac]. In biology the average age is even higher, 39 old when they did 
their work.« (Albury & Schwartz, 1982) The above mentioned »ex­
ploitation« proceeds; in the following way. In Great Britain in 1979, e. g., there 
were 2500 PhD scientists permanently out of work compared with 10 000 
employed ones. After the budget cuts of 1980 even one-third of the promoted 
PhD scientists remain without a job. While preparing their PhD dissertation 
they receive a grant from the State and do their research in an institute 
or university for almost no additional money. When they finish their disser­
tations they are already »too old« to be »productive« and the younger 
»apprentices« take their places. »The tenured professors [and the goverment] 
continue to have a source of cheap labour for their labs and the whole revolving 
door is justified on the grounds that one needs ’fresh blood’ to sustain a rese­
arch programme.« (Albury & Schwkrtz, 1982)
As far as the other ’values’, i.e. behaviour, language, and personality, are 
concerned, again they are shaped in such a way to ’protect’ scientific commu­
nities but at the expense of the intelectual freedom of individual scientists.
Once a field of scientific research has been established at a university 
or an institute, scientists (who succeeded in getting positions there) tend to 
achieve their further career goals through the work conducted by their research 
students and apprentices who are trained in precisely the same disciplines 
as they were, since scientists are determined to »remain in that same area 
of research after they graduate as they have little alternative professional 
capability anyway«. (Jagtenberg, 1983) As a consequence of such a protective 
strategy scientific communities become »far more conservative than the wider 
community«. And while scientific communities tend to establish as much 
autonomy, independence, and self-determination as possible, scientists them­
selves do not strive for independence and self-determination at all. Such 
a ’vicious circle’ is typical of any group which tries to ensure its continued 
maintenance and respectability in society by homogenization and standardiz­
ation of its members and itself.
Let us have a closer look at the typical traits of ’homogenized’ scientific 
personalities and behaviour, and the means by which scientific communities 
achieve the homogenization. ,
Cooley (1968) reports on the longitudinal study which involved 700 persons 
in groups from grade 5 through to PhD, and which goal was to find atributes 
and traits of personalities who are likely to become and remain scientists. The 
study shows that scientists-to-be' are »markedly low on social interests, welfare 
interests, and political interests«, »uninterested in dealing with people in their 
day-to-day work«, and highly introverted. These results are in accordance with 
the ones which Roe (1952) obtained studing the careers of 64 leading, male,
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US-born, scientists. Most of the physicists and biologists disliked and avoided 
social occasions, were curious about a special area to the exclusion of all else, 
kept away from emotional situations, reported loneliness and the existence 
of very few friends etc. (in great contrast to social scientists). All these reports 
together with the one by Davis (1965) show also that scientists as well as sci- 
entists-to-be prefer logical, experimental, and simplicity-seeking ways of think­
ing over affective, intuitive, and ambiguity-tolerating. It does not seem likely 
that these features of ’scientific personalities’ are necessary prerequisites for 
achieving new and significant scientific results, but it does seem likely that 
the scientific community Will grossly encourage and support them. And this 
indeed can be abundantly illustrated.
Studying 79 eminent scientists, Hagstrom (1965) shows that any involve­
ment in social action on the part of individual scientists invites the risks of 
ostracism and isolation by the scientific community. Holton (1978), on the 
basis of the 1960 Project TALENT Test-Inventory (refered by Cooley and 
Lohnes (1968)) of almost a half-milion young people in the U.S.A., from grade 
9 to grade 12, who were followed-up five years, concludes that the scientific 
community »help« scientists-to-be to consider logical and experimental versus 
intuitive and ambiguity-tolerating as two mutually exclusive ways of thinking 
instead of tolerably accepting their co-existence. He also shows that any attempt 
of drawing the attention of scientists to any humanistic or cultural concerns 
meets with, an immense amount of disbelief, resistance, or hostility.
Jagtenberg (1983) shows that »[s]cience is not an institution which per­
mits the free expression of the individual. Most pertinently, scientists are 
subject to the social control of professionalism«.
»Knorr and Knorr [1978] have analysed scientific texts as media for con­
structing reality rather than »data which represent reality«. And Zenzen and 
I [Zenzen & Restivo, 1982] have analysed a set of papers in colloid chemistry 
as persuasive efforts. We do not claim that scientific papers are designed to 
persuade people that something that doesn’t exist does exist; nor that per­
suasion is the only aim scientists pursue in writing papers. We do claim that 
scientists need to use a rhetoric of persuasion in order to draw attention to 
and legitimate their findings. Getting a paper which sets forth claims accepted 
for publication i nvolves choosing the »right« words, and deciding when and 
how to use analogies, mathematics, systematic theory, and other resources 
for communicating research.« (Restivo, 1983)
The last quotation brought us to the means which scientific communities 
use to homogenize their members: the inner rules and propaganda.
As for the inner rules, these are the rules (of »behaviour«) scientists be 
obeying while working in a team, writing scientific publications or joining 
scientific meetings, and can be stated as follows:
t
Rule 1 »Unlikely hypotheses are to be avoided at all cost, not least because 
the scientific community is far less tolerant or forgiving on that score than 
almost1 any other group.« (Holton, 1978)
Rule 2 »Statements that fall into areas with a large component of not easily 
verifiable or of falsibiable content are frowned upon, and issues dealing with ...
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long range prediction . . . of scientific findings . . . are not expected to be raised«. 
(Ibid.)
Rule 3 »Concepts which cannot be analysed in terms of simple arithmetic 
continua are not considered scientific«. (Whitley, 1977)
Rule 4 »The desired outcome is the simple, not the complex.« (Holton, 1978) 
Rule 5 A work on a problem is »a problem-solving rather than a truth-seeking 
activity« (Laudan, 1977), and »[o]nly afterwards details are examined for 
their compatibility with the system.« (Fleck, 1980)
That the rules are applied and obeyed is taken care of by peer recognition. 
(Holton, 1978) In case it does not suffice to establish the homogenity of a 
particular scientific community, propaganda can be undertaken as a more 
direct means to this goal.
Niels Bohr defines propaganda in physics as follows:
»[I]n physics, we carry out propaganda. When we believe we have seen 
something more clearly than others, we try to spread out our new insight, 
and that is propaganda . . . I had to argue for two years with Heisenberg and 
Bloch before I could convince them that the new quantum theory depends 
altogether on correspondence . .. It was also hard to make them and others 
accept the notion of complementarity.« (Nielsen, 1963)
Propaganda as a means can be witnessed throughout the history of scien­
ce:
»Sommerfeld may be considered as a propagandist: Some of his activities 
recall the original meaning of propaganda as s missionary attitude; more 
generally, we may regard as »instrument of propaganda« the sum of his pub­
lications, talk and lectures . . . ,  since all were more or less deliberate manipu­
lations to augment his fame and to foster his school.« (Eckert, 1987)
Thomas Young adopted »strategies of propaganda« in order to propound 
the wave theory of light. »The successive versions of the wave theory developed 
by Young did no more than deal ad hoc with (some of) its predecessor’s refu­
tations« (Worall, 1976) (Cf. also Laudan, 1981)
Galileo adopted »strategies of propaganda« to win converts to Coperni- 
cunism (Kuhn, 1957). »Once it has been realized that close empirical fit is no 
virtue and that it must be relaxed in times of change, then style, elegance of 
expression, simplicity of presentation, tension of plot and narrative, and seduc­
tiveness of content become important features of our knowledge. They give life 
to what is said and help us to overcome the resistance of observational material. 
They create and maintain interest in a theory that has been partly removed 
from the observational plane and would be inferior to its rivals when judged by 
the customary standards. It is in this context that much of Galileo’s work 
should be seen. This work has often been likened to propaganda [Koyre, 1939] 
—and propaganda it certainly is. But propaganda of this kind is not a marginal 
affair that may or may not be added to allegedly more substantial means of 
defence, and that should perhaps be avoided by the ’professionally honest 
scientists’. In the circumstances we are going to consider, propaganda is of the 
essence. It is of the essence because interest must be created at a time when
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usual methodological prescription have no point of attack; and because this 
interest must be maintained . . . until new reasons arrive.« (Feyerabend, 1978) 
And this is literally also applicable to the previous example of the theories of 
light, j
In the »work [which] led Dalton to the epochal concepts of the chemical 
atom, atomic weight, the law of multiple proportions ... each and every one of 
his steps was factually wrong or logically inconsistent.« (Holton, 1978)
To cut the long propaganda story short an optimist could advise us to 
adept Encyclopaedia Britannica’s suggestion »that a given propagandist may 
look upon himself as an educator, may believe that he is uttering the purest 
truth, that he is emphasizing or distorting certain aspects of the truth only 
to make valid message more persuasive, and that the course of action that he 
recommends is in fact the best action that the reactor could take«. And that 
would be a soothing happy end of curious histories of scientific achievements. 
If there was only one truth of particular phenomena. Since it is not so, the 
story goes on.
For, if truths were unique, numerous theories of numerous scientific fields 
the society has a need for, would air have' monopolistic positions and would 
not be truly competitive. Thus their propaganda would really be nothing but 
education. Since very often there are more than one empirically indistinguish­
able truths of particular phenomena available, i. e. several rival theories 
can be formulated on the very same phenomena, their propaganda reflects 
their factual and vociferous competitivness and rivalry, as the elaboration in 
the last section will show.
AN INNER ENVIRONMENT
What does the foregoing elaboration amounts to?
In general, it seems that the outer social and cultural environment. stimu­
lates particular scientific fields but bears no direct influence on the structure 
of particular theories within the fields. The structure of theories is nevertheless 
often influenced by the environment, however only the inner one, in the process 
of its strugle to gain autonomy and respectability in the society.
In particular, it seems that such an influence occurs whenever rival 
theories, empirically indistinguishable at the time, are formulated without 
regard as to whether the field in question is in a Kuhnian »crisis« or not, and 
I shall illustrate this process on the example of the wave-particle duality of 
light and matter.
However, before dwelling on the case it seems unavoidable to consider 
Forman’s (1971) thesis which boils down to the claim that the German cultural 
and social environments »led physicists to ardently hope for, actively search 
for, and willingly embrace an acausal quantum mechanics«. Stated in more 
detail, »suddenly deprived, by a change in public values, of the approbation 
and prestige which they had enjoyed before and during World War I, the 
German physicists were impelled to alter their ideology and even the content
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of their science1 [quantum mechanics] in order to recover a favorable public 
image. In particular, many resolved that one way or another, they must rid 
themselves of the albatros of causality«. (Forman, 1971)
Forman demonstrates the last statement »on« the following neophyte 
physicists: Exner, Nernst, Senftleben, Schrödinger, Weyl, von Mises, Schottky, 
and Reichenbach. However, »Forman himself suggests that Exner’s rejection 
of causality was independent of the milieu and of little contemporary relev­
ance«. (Hendry, 1980) Nernst reconverted to supporting the causality ideal 
within few months, then insisting that causality was not only »compatible 
[but] even necessary to the ideals of the milieu« (Ibid.), and »Senftleben did 
not reject causality either« (Ibid.). Schfödinger did not work in Germany at 
the time. He was a Viennese and worked at the University of Zurich from 
1921 until 1927 when he was appointed as Max Planck’s successor at the Uni­
versity of Berlin. B.ut by then he had already published all his articles in which 
he developed his theory of wave mechanics, and the »quantum revolution« 
was over in 1927 anyhow. (Mehra, 1987) Besides, he too reconverted to causal­
ity. Weyl also worked in Zurich from World War I until 1928. Schottky and 
von Mises did support acausality but as indeterminism and not as lawlessness. 
However, what is more important is that neither Schottky nor von Mises had 
contributed to the quantum theories developed in these years. The same is 
true of Reichenbach who then taught philosophy of physics at the University 
of Berlin and contributed only to the interpretation of the already established 
quantum theory, in 1928. (Jammer, 1978)
In other words, if we -consider the ’content of their science’ (quantum 
mechanics) to mean the ’particular quantum formalism’ elaborated at the time, 
then the thesis that such a content was influenced has been all but proved by 
Forman’s analysis, and having in mind »heavy« mathematics underlying the 
quantum formalism this was to be expected. Besides, even if we agree to 
work realy hard to prove the thesis by finding out hidden and indirect influ­
ences of the environment we shall soon find ourselves struck by how few 
theoretical physicists Germany had at the time let alone the number which 
took an active part in creating quantum theories. In 1898 Wilhelm Wien wrote 
to Arnold Sommerfeld: »Theoretical physics in Germany is as good as finished. 
The resons for this are, in the first place, that physicists pursue pure experiment 
almost exclusively and are not interested in theory . .. This is shown exter­
nally by the fact that pure theoretical physics has only two chairs (Berlin 
and Göttingen) and so important a chair as Munich [which has been established 
for Boltzmann in 1890 and abandoned after Boltzmann’s departure in 1894] 
has ceased to exist. At present, theoretical physics has no takers.« (Eckert, 
1987) In the mid twenties we find the situation improved. In Munich were 
Wien, Sommerfeld, Albrecht Unsold (born 1906) and Fritz London (1900?), in 
Tübingen was Alfred Lande (1988), in Leiden Paul Ehrenfest (1880), in Ham­
burg Wolfgang Pauli (1900) and W. Lenz (1900), in Frankfurt Cornelius Lanc- 
zos (1893) and Erwin Madelung (1880), in Gottingen Hertzberg, Norheim, Max 
Born (1928) Eugene Paul Wigner (1902), Werner Heisenberg (1901), Pascal 
Jordan (1902) and Walter Heitler (1904), and in Berlin Albert Einstein (1879),
1 my emphasis
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Max Planck (1858), Walther Hermann Nernst (1864), Arthur Korn (1870), and 
James Franck (1882) (Schottky worked at Siemens, and Exner in Austria). An 
active part in creating the quantum formalism in the mid twenties was taken 
by Born,, Heisenberg, Pauli, Lande, Jordan, Sommerfeld, Korn, Lanczos, 
Madelung, Lenz, and Unsold.
Having in mind their age (especially before World War I) as well as the 
fact that they were just giving birth to a completely new science one cannot 
but wonder about the meaning of Forman’s claim that »suddenly deprived, 
by a change in public values, of the approbation and prestige which they had 
enjoyed before and during World War I, the German physicists were impelled 
t) alter [my emphasis] ... the content of their science«.
We can partly save Forman’s analysis, as proposed by Hendry (1980), 
taking »attacks upon . .. physics [in Germany in the twenties] from outside 
[this] discipline . . . [as] attacks upon [its] value, rather than upon [its] con­
tent«, and accepting that in the »semi-popular addresses discussed by For­
man ... physicists . .. naturally used the language of the milieu, and justified 
the pursuit of their subject in terms that could be understood and appreciated 
by those who were questioning its cultural value« (Hendry, 1983).
However, understood in this way, it is hardly a language specific to a 
particularly German environment since it coincided with analogous languag­
es which new-born quantum physicists used in Switzerland, Denmark, England, 
France and the USA.
Thus, it seems more appropriate to search for roots of acausality issue 
■within the physicists’ community and their theories. In doing so, we first have 
to clarify the very concept of acaüsality. Forman himself, admits that acausal­
ity is very often used as synonymous to indeterminism, and not to denote a 
specific quantum lawlessness. This narrow sense of acausality is, however, not 
what was at stake either in the creation of quantum mechanics or later on, 
for several reasons. First of all, from the very »quantum begining« it was almost 
obvious that quantum mechanics, as accepted in the late twenties, cannot be 
reduced to a deterministic theory. Or, stated in a professional language: »No 
existing so-called ’hidden variable theory’ is a counter-example to von Neu­
mann’s [so-called ’impossibility’] proof.« (Bub, 1969) On the other hand, the 
so-called Bell-type experimental disprovals of hidden-variables have nothing 
to do with the existing hidden-variable theories as ever formulated by their 
propounders (e. g. David Bohm, N. Wiener, A. Siegel, J. H. Tutsch, etc), since 
they are conceived to disprove the local hidden variables which were only 
ever formulated by Bell himself.2 And, as far as the more recent situation is 
concerned, it has been known for over two decades that classical Newtonian 
mechanics is not necessarily deterministic either (Tritton, 1986; Miles, 1984; 
Chirikov, 1979)..»Modern theories of dynamical systems have very clearly demon­
strated the unexpected fact that systems governed by the equations of New­
tonian dynamics do not necessarily exibit the ’predicability’ property. Indeed,
s Bell himself wonders: »why did people go on producing ’impossibility’ proofs, after 
1952 [when Bohm formulated his hidden variable theory], and as recently as 1978? When even 
Pauli, Rosenfeld, and Heisenberg, could produce no more devastating criticism of Bohm’s 
version than to brand-it as »metaphysical« and »ideological«?« (Bell, 1982)
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very recent researches have shown that in wide classes of very simple systems 
satisfying those equations, predicability is impossible beyond a certain definite 
time horizon.« (Lightill, 1986)
What we are, therefore, left with, is acausality in its wider sense of law­
lessness. But is it not a strange theory, the one without laws? Yes, indeed it is, 
and that is the point. Let me elaborate the claim in some detail.
CASE STUDY: THE WAVE-PARTICLE DUALITY OF LIGHT AND MATTER
By the end of the seventeenth century, when the corpusculuar interpre­
tation of light was embraced, »Newton’s doctrine of verae cause . .. was thought 
to exclude the postulation of any entity or process not strictly observable«, 
and it was held that »scientific theories must deal exclusively with entities 
which can be observed or measured«. (Laudan, 1981) Newton himself had not 
published a single of the numerous articles he had written upon aether. How­
ever, towards the middle of the eighteen century the situation changed. »In 
1745, Bryan Robinson published his Sir Isac Newton’s account of the aether. 
A year later Benjamin Willson’s Essay towards an explication of the phenom­
ena of electricity, deduced from eather of Sir Isac Newton appeared . .. By 
the 1760’s, the scientific literature abounded with etheral explanations of heat, 
light, magnetism, and virtually every other physical process. (Laudan, 1981) 
As we would only expect, on the ground of the physical community’s rules 
No. 1, 2 and 3, mentioned above, such »explanations« and their propounders 
were severely attacked by their colleagues, and more or less ostracised from the 
inner community. (Ibid.) Yet, Laudan (1984) claims that »many working scien­
tist in the late 1700’s and early 1800’s [decided] to give up the view that we 
should seek to restrict our theories entirely to claims about observable entities 
and processes«, and that »this important shift in cognitive orientation was 
absolutely essential to the development of [many new] theories«, among them 
those based on the aether assumption, and, in particular, the wave theory 
of light, which was put forward by Thomas Young and Augustin Fresnel at 
the beginning of the 19th century. (Laudan, 1981) Whait, in my opinion, Lau- 
dan has not taken into account is the development of the theory of elasticity, 
the fluid mechanics and acoustics inxthe 18th century. These theories provided 
differential equations, that is a mathematical tool which could have been applied 
to any similar problem, and aether was of such a kind. Therefore, according 
to the afore stated rule No. 5, physicists were allowed to study aether formally 
and mathematically if for no other reason then to enable the community’s 
decision on the rule No. 2 regarding any given etheral theory. For, if a theory 
can be elaborated mathematically then it can be considered scientific according 
to rule 3. In the »light« of these rules the light story can be presented as 
follows.
In 1803 Young reported to the Royal society on two experiments: a spe­
cial kind of diffraction experiment and his famous ’double slit’ experiment. 
Now, the diffraction experiment was an old one, performed for the first time 
in 1665 by Grimaldi, and later on by Newton, Hook, and others, and was
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successfully »explained« by corpuscularians by short-ranged forces emanated 
from the body and acting on the light corpuscles, i. e. deflecting them from 
their natural rectilinear path. ,(Worrall, 1976) The ’double slit’ experiment was, 
on the other hand, so subtle an experiment that no one had succeeded in re- 
paeting it, and, besides, it could have been »explained« in a ’corpuscularian’s 
manner’ as well. In order to convince the physicists’ community that the wave 
proposal was worth considering, Young should have been able to offer a ’cal­
culus’ which would have predict the experimental outcomes. However, Young 
had never elaborated his proposals in a quantitative way. Too many community 
rules were thus violated and, as a result, he was attacked and his work ignor­
ed. Here, we should bear in mind, as the gist of the dispute, that »[n]either 
the corpuscular nor the wave programme had had anything in the way of pre­
dictive empirical success up to this time; both programmes were in the busi­
ness of post hoc explanations.« (Worrall, 1976) Since corpuscularians were in 
power it was they who should have applied the ’rules’ and ostracised oppo­
nents.3
Thus, it does not seem likely that Laudan (1981, 1984) is right when he 
considers the abundance of aether theories as a sign that scientists opened 
their minds. What does seem likely is that scientists have always considered 
that any entity which cannot be quantitatively elaborated ought not be their 
concern. As soon as a new theory can predict particular experimental results, 
no matter whether the theory assumes the existence of an entity which is 
not strictly and directly measured or not, they become interested in it provi­
ded the theory predicts some results which are not predicted by the existent 
theories. Further development of the wave story illustrates this well.
In the late 1810’s Fresnel »elaborated [my emphasis] the wave theory of 
light and applied it to the explanation of diffraction [and interference] phe­
nomena. Poisson, a confirmed corpuscularian and a member of a panel refe­
reeing Fresnel’s paper, observed that, according to the analysis of light which 
Fresnel was using, it would follow that the center of the shadow of a circular 
disk would exhibit a bright spot. This predicted result was highly unlikely; it 
contradicted both the corpuscular theory [actually it contradicted only corpus­
cularians’ expectation, as their theory had not treated such a possibility pre­
viously], and the scientist’s intuitive sense of what was ’natural’. Indeed, the 
fact that the wave theory possessed this bizzare consequence was seen, prior 
to performing the experiment, as a kind of reductio ad absurdum of it. But 
when the appropriate tests were performed, the wave theory was vindicated 
by a concordance between what it predicted and the observed facts.« (Lau­
dan, 1981) Upon further investigation Fresnel found that aether as the carrier 
of light waves should exhibit properties analogous to the ones then known to 
be ascribable to an elastic media as a carier of transverse waves. And by 
that time Claude Navier and Luis Cauchy formulated the equations which
5 An optimist would here remark that it could have been the other way round, as the 
wave interpretation has been known since even before the 1650, especially had Newtdn with 
his authority published his etheral elaborations of natural phenomena. The »other way«, how­
ever, had been unlikely to occur not because of casual personal preference, but because of 
the absence of the calculus for waves at the time when corpuscles had, at least as a possiblity, 
Newtonian mechanics at their disposal.
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described waves in an elastic media, which were applied to light waves by Denis 
Poisson, Franz Ernst Neumann, and Oeorge Green. They however faced 
difficulties in finding such properties of, aether which would ensure such 
boundary conditions of the equations as necessary to give appropriate trans­
versal waves as solutions. To overcome these difficulties James MacCullagh 
concentrated on the transversal waves in no-matter-which-kind of aether 
and obtained the wave equation which later on James Clerk Maxwell obtained 
as well. In a word, by the mid 19th century the modern wave optics has been, 
in effect, established. That is, prior to the experimentum crucis performed by 
Leon Foucault in 1850. Namely, until the 1820’s as we have already stressed, 
both the wave and the corpuscular theories provided explanations for the 
performed experiments post hoc. For the Fresnel-Poisson disk-shadow-with-a- 
-oright-spot experiment which the undulationists predicted, the corpus- 
cularians were still able to provide at least post hoc explanation (Worrall, 1976). 
But there was a point in which they contradicted each other in predictions in 
advance. According to the wave theory, in fact already: according to Fresnel’s 
elaborations in the late 1810’s, velocity of light in a media denser than air 
should be smaller than its velocity in air, while according to the corpuscular 
theory it should be the other way round. Foucault’s experiment in 1850 decided 
in favour of the wave theory almost 30 years after its acceptance %y the 
physicists' community.
In the second half of the 19th century James Clerk Maxwell formulated 
a general theory of electromagnetism which included the wave theory of light 
thus interpreting the light wave as an electromagnetic wave, and which did 
not include any formal consideration of properties of aether. In his Trea­
tise he mentions aether only once, on page 782, stating, in effect, that aether 
is neither in contradiction to nor plays any role in his theory.
In 1887 Albert Abraham Michelson and Eduard Morley performed the 
so-called Michelson-Morley experiment in order ' to determine the absolute 
velocity of the earth through aether and the result was null. Hendrik Antoon 
Lorentz introduced the so-called Lorentz contraction to explain the result in 
a way that Would not contradict the aether hypothesis. In 1905 Albert Ein­
stein formulated the special theory of relativity which covered both the null 
result and the Lorentz contraction and had no bearing on aether. Since it was 
immediately clear that Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism is not in contra­
diction to the new theory it looked as if the wave theory of light would stay 
intact. However, »[i]n Einstein’s paper on light quanta of 1905 the corpuscular 
structure of light was developed from a formal analogy between gas fluctu­
ations and radiation fluctuations«. (Darrigol, 1986) The corpusculuar structure 
of light could explain the photoelectric effect (first discovered in 1887 by Hein­
rich Hertz) for which Philipp Lenard’s experiment in 1902 showed to be in 
opposition to Maxwell’s theory, but at the same time it brought the old wave- 
-particle dispute back to the stage.
Einstein himself did not like the idea of the corpuscular structure of light, 
i.e. the light quanta or photons, and he had already in 1Ö09 shown that Max­
well’s equations might yield pointlike singular solutions in additions to waves.
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A new decisive experiment was needed. And was provided by Arthur 
Holly Compton in 1922. The direct scattering of photons by electrons, with a 
recoil of the electron has been recorded, and the corpuscular structure of light 
confirmed.
At the same time (1922—23) Luis de Broglie, inspired by Einstein’s 1905 
and 1909 papers, approached the problem from the opposite side. If light can 
exhibit corpuscular properties, could we not also expect of the proper particles 
to exhibit wave properties. He immediately obtained an impressive confirmation 
for the idea: the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization could be interpreted as a re­
sonance condition for waves along closed orbits and the assumption was con­
firmed experimentally in 1925 when a diffraction of electrons was recorded. 
On the other side he carried Einstein’s 1909 idea further and in 1926 developed 
’new optics of light quanta’ as ’mobile singularities’.
In 1925 Heisenberg, Born, Jordan, and Pauli formulated the matrix quan­
tum theory, and in the same year Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac developed his 
quantum algebra which he proved equivalent to Heisenberg-Born matrix 
formulation.
In 1926 Erwin Schrödinger created the wave mechanics and showed it 
to be equivalent to the previous two formulations.
At the same year Max Born interpreted Schrödinger’s waves as proba­
bility amplitudes, but Schrödinger did not like it. For, he, together with Ein­
stein, Planck, and de Broglie, did not like »all this quantum jumping« (Sprin- 
gerei). After Max Born put forward the interpretation, he wrote to him: »I 
have, however, the impression that you and the others, who essentially share 
your opinion, are too deeply under the spell of those concepts (like stationary 
states, quantum jumps, etc.), which have obtained civic rights in our think­
ing in the last dozen years; hence you can not do full justice to an attempt 
to breake away from this scheme of thought«. To Niels Bohr he wrote: »one 
should not, even if a hundred trials fail, give up the hope of arriving at the 
goal — I do not say by means of classical pictures, but by logically consistent 
conceptions — of the real structure of space-time process. It is extremely 
probable that this is possible«. (Mehra, 1987)
Along similar lines of reasoning, in a letter to Born in 1926, »Einstein had 
regarded the electromagnetic wave fields as a kind of »ghost field« whose 
waves served to guide the motion of corpuscular light quanta«. (Ibid.)
In 1926 Erwin Madelung proposed the hydrodynamic form of quantum 
mechanics, in'which, he claimed, »the current problem on quanta has found 
its solution in a hydrodynamics of continuously distributed electricity«. (Jam­
mer, 1974)
In 1927 Niels Bohr put forward the ’principle of complementarity’ which 
states that quantum objects can not simultaneously exhibit both their wave 
and their particle aspects. This principle has been later supplemented by the 
claim that the matrix-wave formulation of quantum mechanics completely 
decribes not only ensembles but individual quantum objects as well. Such 
an interpretation of the bare matrix-wave quantum formalism is often called 
the Copenhagen interpretation.
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Everyone of the last three theories had a serious flaw when compared with 
the minimal matrix-wave (Hilbert space) theory (whose »-minimality-« was, 40 
years later, called the ’statistical interpretation’). In de Broglie’s theory classi­
cal features of quantum objects cannot, out of principle, be observed. They are 
assumed to be hidden at least with regard to the existent kinds of measure­
ments. However, the most important flaw of the theory was additional compli­
cations in formalism which were superfluous for any application at the time. 
The same is valid for Madelung’s theory which in addition to this assumes the 
existence of aether. The Copenhagen interpretation, in the end, also ascribes 
some properties to quantum objects which cannot be proved. Namely, if the 
corpuscular aspect of an individual quantum object cannot be defined while 
the object is exhibiting its undulatory aspect then the claim that the object is 
nevertheless completely described by the minimal quantum theory remains 
extrinsic with regard to the theory if it cannot be proven within the theory 
as it cannot. This fact illuminates the sense in which the physicists referred to 
by Forman used to ascribe acausality to quantum mechanics when they did 
not take acausality as synonymous to indeterminism but in its proper meaning 
of lawlessness. Here I have in mind Born, Heisenberg, and Sommerfeld, i.e. 
the only physicists quoted by Forman (1971, pp. 105—107) who no sooner than, 
in 1927 gave the notion of acausality a tone of lawlessness. They obviously 
did not have in mind-de Broglie’s or Madelung’s causal description of quantum 
objects but simply formally undescribed and in this sense lawless individual 
quantum objects, that is the Copenhagen interpretation. The clue of such 
lawlessness is the following.
When we prepare individual quantum objects (e.g. photons) by a prepara- 
tional device (polarizer), one by one, then we are not able to predict whether 
we shall detect the prepared property on each particular object by a detection 
device (analyzer deflected at an angle with regard to polarizer) or not. What 
we are able to predict is the percentage of objects which are going to exhibit 
th£ prepared property (that is, we are able to predict the intensity of the light 
beam). Thus, decisive laws for statistical ensembles of quantum objects exist, 
they are empirically confirmed, and in this sense quantum mechanics is causal. 
There have been particular laws formulated by de Broglie, Madelung, their 
successors, and others (see below) for individual quantum objects but it does 
not seem likely that they can be conclusively confirmed by the existent 
measurements (though some experiments are currently under way in France 
and Italy), and in this sense quantum mechanics is acausal.
In 1927, according to the rules no. 2 and 4, de Broglie’s and Madelung’s 
causal (in both individual and statistical sense) quantum theories were excluded 
from the physicists’ community soon after they were formulated: de Broglie 
and Madelung gave up pressed by the community (Jammer, 1974). According 
to rule 2 the Copenhagen interpretation should have been excluded as well. 
However, the minimal formulation, feared the physical community, would leave 
too much space and would perhaps attract physicists to investigate further 
instead of directing them to apply the new theory where needed. Thus, after
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considerable propagandist efforts on the part of Bohr and his collaborators, 
the Copenhagen interpretation was embraced/1
Today, there are again many quantum theories. In the meantime it has been 
ensured that this is just a business of producing new formalisms which will 
not provoke unproductive ontological disputes. Causal de Broglie’s theory 
was reestablished in the 1950’s and developed further, various phase space 
and fuzzy phase space theories were, mainly for application in chemistry, 
developed from the 1940’s on, various stochastical theories have been develo­
ped mainly as a result of the development of the statistical electrodynamics, 
and some of them can be regarded as a continuation of Madelung’s theory. (For 
references see Jammer (1974) and Pavičić (1982))
, Taken all together it seems that there is no influence on the structure of 
scientific theories from the outer environment and that an influence is appar­
ent in the inner environment whenever rival theories are concerned. Namely, 
the inner community chooses, acording to its rules, one of the rival theories 
as the official one. It largely affects further education and the free intellectual 
will of individual scientists, although they are usually not aware of this fact 
by virtue of such an education. Even when outer demands obviously change 
their scientific interest scientists are ready to accept this fact as their own 
decision or at best call it a »fashion«. Yet, such an influence does not affect 
the very formal structure of scientific theories. Namely, literally a theory of 
natural phenomena cannot be influenced except in the above described way 
when there are rival theories, and, on the other hand, today there is almost 
no field which is completely barred.
However, the overall dynamics of a scientific field obviously depends upon 
the number of scientists engaged. In other words, had we been more democrati­
cally educated and given possibility of free choice we would not have had 
our ’democratic Western society’, and in this sense we can say that even the 
outer environment influences the structure of scientific theories.
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Fizikalne teorije i njihova društvena i kulturna okolina
Razmatrano je da li društvena i kulturna okolina pri­
rodnih nauka, posebno fizike, može utjecati na strukturu 
njihovih teorija. Pokazuje se da na pojedine teorije okolina 
utječe, međutim, ne direktno, već preko znanstvene zajednice 
u procesu njene borbe za autonomiju i položaj u društvu. Po­
sebno, takav utjecaj postoji kad god se pojave »suparničke« 
teorije koje su u nekom periodu empirijski nerazlučive, bez 
obzira na to da li je odnosno znaristveno područje u Kuh- 
novskoj »krizi« ili ne. Mehanizam pomoću kojeg se znanst­
vena zajednica homogenizira naspram šire društvene oko­
line, praveći utilitarističku i pragmatističku selekciju među 
suparničkim teorijama, je razrađen. Proces je ilustriran pri­
mjerom valno-'čestične dualnosti svjetlosti i materije.
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